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Abstract—In Internet of Things, where billions of devices with
limited resources are communicating with each other, security
has become a major stumbling block affecting the progress of
this technology. Existing authentication schemes-based on digital
signatures have overhead costs associated with them in terms of
computation time, battery power, bandwidth, memory, and re-
lated hardware costs. Radio frequency fingerprint (RFF), utilizing
the unique device-based information, can be a promising solution
for IoT. However, traditional RFFs have become obsolete because
of low reliability and reduced user capability. Our proposed
solution, Metasurface RF-Fingerprinting Injection (MeRFFI), is
to inject a carefully-designed radio frequency fingerprint into
the wireless physical layer that can increase the security of
a stationary IoT device with minimal overhead. The injection
of fingerprint is implemented using a low cost metasurface
developed and fabricated in our lab, which is designed to make
small but detectable perturbations in the specific frequency band
in which the IoT devices are communicating. We have conducted
comprehensive system evaluations including distance, orientation,
multiple channels where the feasibility, effectiveness, and relia-
bility of these fingerprints are validated. The proposed MeRFFI
system can be easily integrated into the existing authentication
schemes. The security vulnerabilities are analyzed for some of
the most threatening wireless physical layer-based attacks.
Index Terms—Metasurfaces, Intelligent Reflective Surfaces,
Reconfigurable Intelligent Surfaces, Reconfigurable Reflect Ar-
ray, Smart Reflect Arrays, Physical Layer Security, RF Finger-
printing, IOT Security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet of things (IoT), often termed as the fourth industrial
revolution, is revolutionizing our daily life and gradually
overwhelming over existing IT devices, such as PCs and mo-
biles, by their ubiquitous connectivity and diverse applications.
It is forecasted that by 2022 around 18 billion connected
devices will be related to IoT [1]. The global market for
IoT technology has reached $190 billion in 2018, and it is
projected to reach $1012 billion by 2026 according to a data
and analytics company [2]. However, most IoT devices are
operating without a secure authentication procedure which
makes them vulnerable to cyber attacks.
The current state-of-the-art IoT connectivity technologies
employ cryptographic protocols [3] which are vulnerable to
attacks [4]. Increasing computational complexity of the algo-
rithms is an obvious but costly solution. A promising cost-
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Figure 1. IoT Network in which all devices are equipped with MeRFFI, and
an adversary trying to access the network.
effective solution to tackle the aforementioned challenge for
IoT came in the form of radio frequency fingerprinting (RFF)
[5], which can be observed from the electromagnetic waves
radiated by the transmitter. By verifying the RF-fingerprint, se-
cure authentication can be established between IoT nodes. RFF
is a type of device hardware-based fingerprinting, which is
built on the fact that the fabrication process of the transmitter,
especially, analog components, introduces certain distinctive
imperfections that can act as the fingerprint of the device.
To be qualified as a fingerprint, the RFF has to be unique,
reliable, and unforgeable to be adopted into practical IoT
systems. However, traditional RFF methods are becoming
less prominent due to advanced manufacturing techniques,
which results in certain limitations: a) lack of configurability–
users have no control over the generation of fingerprint;
b) weak distinguishability– extracted RFFs from different
devices may exhibit similar properties with each other because
of the reduced user capacity; c) low reliability– the RFFS
are minuscule and when transmitted over the channel gets
diminished, distorted and corrupted by noise d) complicated
data processing– more computation is needed to mine incon-
spicuous device features caused by the reduced feature space.
To address the issues of low reliability, reduced user ca-
pacity, diminishing distinguishability, and complications in
data processing of RFFs, we propose a novel injectable RFF
scheme through electromagnetic metasurfaces (also termed
Reconfigurable Intelligent Surfaces [6] or Intelligent Reflective
Surfaces [7]) . Specifically, we designed and developed a
system called metasurface for radio frequency fingerprint
injection (MeRFFI). MeRFFI is a metasurface [8] designed
to make small but detectable perturbations in the specific
frequency band in which the IoT devices are communicating.
MeRFFI is intended to be used for stationary IoT devices
which uses wideband RF channels for communication, making
it useful for systems requiring high security like printers,
health gadgets, wireless cameras, backhaul of sensor networks
and industrial monitoring systems. MeRFFI is low cost (less
ar
X
iv
:2
00
6.
06
89
5v
1 
 [e
es
s.S
P]
  1
2 J
un
 20
20
2than 20 cents) and consumes very little power ( less than
50 millijoules per code), and its form factor is small such
that it can conveniently be attached to the IoT transmitters
(eg: cellphone cover, health watch’s backplane or as part of
transmitter casing).
We present our system with two modes of operation, the
passive (fixed pattern) mode provides easy and low-cost access
to IoT devices that requires no further processing, while the
active (adjustable pattern) mode can provide a time-varying
signature by programmatically changing electromagnetic prop-
erties of the metasurface with a microcontroller unit. Our key
contributions are:
• To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to propose
and design a metasurface-based RFF injection system,
which overcomes the problems of low reliability and
reduced user capacity from traditional RFFs. We have
modeled the metasurface enhanced signature injection
scheme and further provided potential attack scenarios
and security analysis.
• We developed and implemented a low-cost MeRFFI pro-
totype. With comprehensive evaluations, including dis-
tance, orientation, and multiple channels on the system,
we demonstrate the feasibility of MeRFFI as a realistic
security signature for IoT authentication.
• The developed MeRFFI has an intrinsic flexible property
that can be utilized in different applications based on
different levels of security, cost restraints, and processing
capabilities. We demonstrated how MeRFFI could be
used in an IoT scenario using three easily integrable
authentication protocols.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, two predominantly used schemes used for
IoT authentication are discussed Radio Frequency fingerprint-
ing and hardware signature embedding.
A. RF-Fingerprinting (RFF):
The cost constraints on the manufacturing process of IoT
transmitters have made the intrinsic variations caused by the
components in it, unavoidable. In a typical Direct Conversion
transmitter [9], which is commonly used in IoT transmitters,
RFFs are produced by most of its functional components.
The digital to analog converters are often affected by
integral non-linearity (INL). These nonlinear effects have been
used as fingerprints [10]. Several variations can arise from
the use of different signal processing techniques [11] in the
transmitting hardware. These cannot be eliminated from the
manufacturing process as they depend upon variable tolerances
of the different device components. In the mixer part, the
in-phase and the quadrature components are required to be
at a specific phase angle apart (e.g., 90◦). This imbalance
between the in-phase and quadrature components have also
been leveraged for RF fingerprinting [12]. The nonlinear
characteristics of a PA often vary widely according to its
average output [13], as the heat dissipation would alter the
chip temperature and hence there would be device dependent
signatures [14] present in the electromagnetic waves emitted
by the transmitter. The RF front end that is the drive circuit
along with the antenna and its effects on polarization and
voltage has also been studied for RFFs [15]. Clock Jitter
is another RFF [16], which remains fairly consistent over
time, but the clock skews vary significantly across devices.
Apart from these, observations have been made on turn-
on and turn-off transient of the communication device. The
energy envelope of the instantaneous transient signal has been
researched as RFFs [16].
These RFFs have known vulnerabilities to two main types
of replay attacks [17], the signal replay attack (receive and re-
play without modification), and feature replay attack (receive,
analyze, generate and transmit). When the RF-fingerprinting
features, modulation based RFF, and transient-based RFF were
tested with feature replay attacks, it was found that modulation
based RFFs can be feature replayed with almost 100 percent
accuracy. This happens because of the simplicity of the mod-
ulation based features. Transient-based features have proven
to be more effective. However, commercial wireless devices
cannot capture the transient-based features as they do not have
the required dynamic operating frequency range (They are
generally processed from high frequencies).
B. Hardware Signature Embedding:
This method uses intrinsic defect based properties to gen-
erate true random and unique numbers and apply these as
a replacement for cryptographic codes. The most popular
solution that came using this principle, applies physically
unclonable functions (PUFs). PUF maps input challenges to
output responses based on a function determined by inherent
variations of that circuit. These responses are used in place of
digital signature and are included in the communication packet
transmitted by IoT devices for securing the communication
between them [18]. The PUF based solutions are not really
physical layer fingerprinting as they are digitally transmitting
the signature with the sent packet and they are prone to
machine learning based attacks [19].
III. PROBLEM DEFINITION AND SOLUTION
RF-fingerprinting being an up-and-coming solution for the
Internet of Things has certain well-established drawbacks :
A. Reliability vs. Vulnerability
RF-Fingerprints(RFFs) are either too feeble to survive the
wireless channel, or the variations are too simple or obvious
and can be easily attacked. There exists a trade-off between re-
liability and security [20], mainly due to the wireless channel.
A high spoofing resistance means that the system has a low
noise resistance. Conversely, if an RFF is designed to detect
even the most feeble variations, its reliability takes a hit, as the
channel variations make the legitimate devices unrecognizable.
B. Weak Distiguishability and Reduced User Capacity
Typical experimental validations of RF-fingerprinting use
either high-end measurement device (like software-defined
radio [5]) or network analyzer) or use a line-of-sight (LOS)
channel with high SNR [11]. When low-cost off-shelf de-
vices are used (transmitter and receiver) in a noisy multipath
channel, the distinguishability of the authenticating devices is
greatly reduced [21]. This leads to the reduction of the user
capacity of the RFFs.
3C. The Complication in Data Processing
Weak distinguishability and adverse effect of the channel
leads to the usage of complicated data processing [22] or large
time series data [21], including complex feature extraction
mechanism for mining the RFFs. Noise and multipath com-
ponents in the real world channel also adds to the complexity
of RFF mining. Recently, an attempt to minimize the channel
effects was proposed with the use of tunable FIR filter at the
transmitter [5]. This FIR tuning required computation of the
filter taps at the server, which are then downlinked back to
the transmitter to improve the RFF accuracy. Although this
improved the reliability, it increased the hardware and power
cost of using a continuously tunable FIR filter in the hardware
and a 3 step authentication procedure having security flaws.
D. Design Consideration: Need for Configurability
Let us consider the mathematical model of an RF-
Fingerprinting system. For an IoT network with N nodes, let
the ith node be transmitting a signal to the server. The received
signal r(t) received by the server can be formulated as:
r(t) = Fi
[
x(t)
] ∗ h(t) + η(t), (1)
where Fi[·] is the transceiver effect imposed on user i, x(t) is
the transmitted signal, h(t) is the wireless channel, and η(t)
is the noise. These features of each transceiver, i.e., Fi[·], are
unique RFFs and can be observed from the electromagnetic
waves that are emitted by it. However, with developing manu-
facturing processes, these intrinsic variations are diminishing.
The variation caused due to the function Fi[·] recedes and
becomes indistinguishable from that of the other node, given
practical environmental noise. This greatly reduces the user
capacity of the RF-Fingerprinting system. Furthermore, if the
threshold conditions are adjusted to accommodate such a
minute variation, it would make the system unreliable.
Design Requirements: :
a) Configurability: A discernible solution to the above prob-
lems, is to design the intrinsic variation Fi[·], which would
ensure that the patterns are different for different users.
It can also be perceived as intentionally creating some
perturbations in the transmitted signal unique to the IoT
device. If Fi[·] is configured, a balance between reliability
and security can be designed based on the wireless channel.
It can also eliminate the weak distinguishability and the
need for complicated data mining since the features are
software controlled.
b) Channel Robustness: The design has to allow the RFF to
be prominent through the wireless channel.
c) Low power consumption: IoT devices with batteries are
power-constrained and cannot expend much energy for
authentication alone.
d) Non-intrusiveness and integrable: This solution should
neither adversely affect the communication link not com-
plicate the protocol in use.
e) Cost-effectiveness:: Several IoT applications cannot afford
expensive hardware.
E. Proposed Solution
In this paper, we propose to use ‘metasurface’ (A brief
introduction about metasurface is given in section IV) to inject
a controlled, well-intended RF Fingerprint, which is more
prominent and can carry more complex features in the physical
layer economically. Using the metasurface (Intelligent reflec-
tive surface) we create constructive signal additions at different
frequencies within the same band. Our system is very energy
efficient as it can work with no power or with few hundred
micro-joules depending on the application. Furthermore, It can
be built cheaply for $0.2 or less. Our solution also makes
the signature injection part of the transmitter non-intrusive,
i.e., Our metasurface can be attached to the transmitter (IoT
device) and is designed to induce electromagnetic changes
in the waves that are emitted by the transmitter (an example
application would be cellphone case or additional inexpensive
cover for the IoT device). Since this is attached at the
transmitter end, the function Fi[·] would be a convolution of
the designed property induced by our metasurface s(t).
F. Analysing IoT hardware for RFF injection
Since our solution is a low cost accessary to the IoT devices
aiding in its authentication, it is necessary to analyze the
hardware components of the IoT transmitter with the objective
to find the answer to two important questions. The primary one
is
a) Can a security signature be injected into the wireless
physical layer by changing the existing hardware?
To answer this question let us consider the injection of such
a signature by making changes specifically in the passband of
the transmitted signal. In a typical IoT transmitter such as
the direct conversion transmitter [9] shown in figure 2, the
digital to analog converter (DAC’s)takes in data bits as in-
phase and quadrature components. The output of the DAC is
then filtered and sent to a mixer, where the baseband is up-
converted to RF frequency. The Mixers are driven I and Q
local oscillator inputs. The output is then passed through a
power amplifier (PA) and is sent to the antenna drive circuit
via a bandpass filter (BPF reduces out of band emissions). All
the existing RFFS are created due to the imperfections in the
above-mentioned components [23].
To create controlled perturbations of any of these respective
components is not easy. Power Amplifiers of IoT transmitters
are carefully designed with the tradeoff between nonlinearity
and power-efficiency [24]. The power amplifier distortions,
even though are hardware signatures, can result in a perfor-
mance loss; hence, they are carefully designed in a certain
operating point [24]. Thus designing a variation in PAs is
too complicated, given the constraints of it affecting the
performance. Similarly, reconfigurable mixers [25] do exist,
Figure 2. Typical Direct Conversion transmitter
4but these reconfigurations do not create distortions. Mixer
distortions would create synchronization and timing issues,
thus affect communication performance. The DAC’s are also
very carefully designed with complex constraints to reduce the
power for IoT transmitters [26]. Thus introducing configurable
distortions to these transmitter entities may prove very costly,
which leaves us with the RF filters. Injection of an RFF can be
made possible via a digital filtering technique, which would
create that feeble variation or make deliberate changes to the
hardware that would create uniquely identifiable signatures
from device to device. Thus our questions on the feasibility of
injecting RFF is narrowed down to the possibility of creating
perturbations in the wireless physical layer with the help of
carrier shaping digital RF- filter. This brings us to another
important question that needs to be answered,
b) Can this signature injecting, RF-filter be cost effective
and power efficient to be adopted for IoT authentication?
Let us consider the hardware realization of a passband filter
that can generate a fingerprint. We group them as two main
methods of realization, which is as described below:
1) FIR filter with window: Firstly, we can design a digital
finite impulse response (FIR) filter, apply a suitable window
function, then approximate the functions to make them im-
plementable [27]. They can be implemented either by using
a separate DSP chip [28] or by designing a dedicated system
on a chip (SoC) [29] comprising of latches, multipliers, and
adders.
a) Complexity analysis: Consider FIR filter with a Kaiser
window that can alter the emitted carrier wave, which
can supposedly act as an RFF. The choice of this specific
method to analyze was considered primarily because the
FIR method can be represented as integer math [27] and
thus making them realizable with hardware compared to
IIR filters. Secondly, a typical kaiser window [30] is applied
here, which is appropriate for generating sharp peaks.
This algorithm can be considered as 3 steps. Firstly, the
computation of FFT , which has a computational com-
plexity of O(M) [30], where M is the number of samples.
Secondly, the computations of FIR filter output, which has
a fixed number of multiplications and additions involved.
Finally, the computation of a Kaiser window, which has
the complexity of O(N ∗ log(N), where N is the number
of frequency samples points. The implementation of the
first two steps can be performed either by DSP [27] or
an SoC [29] as previously mentioned and the computation
of custom window needs a numerical function generator
(NFG) [31] unit.
b) DSP implementation: Although there are very cheap
DSP’s available for as small a price as $2 [32], they have
an idle power consumption of 0.15mW at 1.05V supply
[32]. Furthermore, the delays involved in using a DSP
unit is larger because it needs to perform the total filter
operation in iterations. This is because the DSP relies on
a single efficient multiplication and adder unit (MAC) to
perform the operation per loop [33]. The resulting power
consumption and time delay are not affordable for an IoT
device.
c) SoC implementation: The same filter implemented using
SoC, however, would be faster as they can perform the
operation in a single flow, but the complexity of the 3 stages
are tough to be designed in a single chip without significant
approximations [27], as they rely on implementing the
operation with only latches, multipliers, and adders. Also,
the power consumption of such a filter to of size N = 16 is
estimated to be 28.7mW for low throughput applications
[34], thus making them unaffordable for IoT devices.
2) RF resonator Filters:: Another way of making the
variation could be through RF filters [35]. Out of the RF filter
technologies that exist, such as discrete inductor-capacitor
(LC) filters, multilayer and monoblock ceramic filters, acoustic
filters, and cavity filters, the current state of the art wireless
communication chips employ BAW filters [36] to achieve
operation. Even though devices with higher Q-factor and lower
insertion loss have been designed, complex signatures with
configurable BAW filters [37] of RFF capability are a few
decades away from becoming a reality. It is difficult to design
these filters with precise cutoff, group delay, selectivity, ripple,
and isolation between input and output signals [38].
From the above discussion, it clear that making the transmit-
ter chip with reconfigurable hardware components for security
injection would prove to be costly, inefficient and may affect
communication performance.
G. Configuration for Different Security Level
We present two types of metasurfaces that can be employed
with the design goals we have set.
a) Passive metasurface - This metasurface has a well de-
signed, feature rich signature injection capability but is
static. Thus making it suitable for very low-cost applica-
tions.
b) Active (programmable) metasurface - This metasurface
can change its property based on a control input while
maintaining the richness in the feature space. This feature
is very suitable for IoT applications, which are not strictly
energy constrained but needs a more secure solution as the
injected signature can change with respect to control input.
With the capabilities as mentioned above, we designed
and implemented the metasurface RF fingerprint injection
(MeRFFI) System, which is a programmable metasurface,
MeRFFI prototype has the capability to work in both the
modes due to its programmability.
We present three different ways in which MeRFFI can be
used for IoT authentication.
1) Passive Mode: Protocol 1 - low power application :
Here the MeRFFI Device used does not have channel selection
or signature injection control mechanism. It is a passive meta-
surface like a passive RFID card, which consumes no addi-
tional power. A different pattern is printed on MeRFFI, and
these signatures are injected into the wireless physical layer.
During authentication, the IoT node (I) sends an authentication
request signal (Req) along with its device id (DevID) to the
access point (A). This signal is injected with the physical
signature (IRFF1) from MeRFFI.
I → A : Pilot{Req,DevID}|IRFF1
5The access point (A) extracts the injected channel state infor-
mation (inj C Est). It forwards this request (AReq) to the
authentication server (S).
A→ S : A Req{inj C Est,DevID}
The authentication server extracts the features (fp) and checks
for a match. If the feature and DevID match to that of the
registered device, the server sends back an acknowledgment
message with a hash code of the feature (H(fp)) along with
the target DevID. When node I receives this authentication
acknowledgment, it can also verify that it is associating with
the correct server from the hash H(fp).
2) Active Mode: Protocol 2 - highly secure application
and high power consumption : This protocol uses the active
version of MeRFFI that uses control voltage based signature
injection. The IoT node (I) sends a request to the authentica-
tion server (A) using the same message flow as in the previous
protocol. The authentication sends back the acknowledgment
along with the hash of the feature extracted from the pilot
signal (H(fp)). On receiving the AReq the IoT node I does
a server hash correlation and verifies the hash. After the
hash is verified the node pushes n− 1 number of designated
signatures, which are allotted to the node. On receiving all the
signatures, the authentication server correlates all the received
signatures (IRFF1, IRFF2, ....IRFFn) with the device id
(DevID). MeRFFI’s high user capacity supports this highly
secure protocol.
Protocol 3 - highly secure application and medium
power consumption : This protocol is very similar to pro-
tocol 2 except that IoT node (I) sends multiple signatures
to the authentication server (A) from different channels. This
protocol is suggested based on the hypothesis that the same
signature appears as distinct from different channels. This is
later validated with our experiments. The difference in the
property of MeRFFI in different channels, is leveraged here
to create a highly secure protocol.
IV. META-SURFACE RF-FINGERPRINT INJECTION
(MERFFI) SYSTEM DESIGN
The radio frequency fingerprint injection system is de-
scribed along with the basic user enrollment and authentication
scheme. Consider a scenario as shown in figure 1 where there
are N nodes trying to connect with the authentication server.
All the registered nodes in the network are attached with
the MeRFFI. As it can been seen in the figure 3, during
the enrollment phase, the legitimate node sends a known
pilot signal to the server over the wireless channel. The
attached MeRRFI device injects an RF security signature in
this transmitted electromagnetic wave. The server on receiving
the node’s signal measures the channel state information (CSI)
and then extracts the injected features from the measured
CSI. A classifier trains and classifies the signatures of all
the legit user devices and stores them in a database. During
the authentication phase, when the user nodes request access,
the server measures the CSI and extracts the features of the
signature from this request signal. The projected features are
then matched with the enrolled user devices and is granted
authentication on a match. An attacker node, on the other
hand, would not have the injected signatures; hence their
authentication will be denied.
MeRFFI knows the communication channel number (spe-
cific frequency) allocated for communication. It can tune to
the present channel of operation. Then it supplies a software
programmed voltage vector input, where all unit elements
are controlled by each in the voltage values. This results in
MeRFFI altering the wireless physical layer by injecting a
physical signature.
A. Metasurface Preliminary
Metasurfaces [39] are ultra-thin and planar electromagnetic
devices, which are made up of several unit elements. These
unit elements are sub-wavelength in size compared to tradi-
tional microwave patches and printed antenna elements. They
have heavily gained popularity because of the tunability of
their individual unit elements [40].
The metasurface for RF-fingerprint injection is a prototype
that has software programmed tunability. The material design
specification and its tuning control are described below.
B. MeRFFI Prototype Design
MeRFFI is a software controlled meta-surface used for
injecting the security signature and has two main requirements.
Firstly, to bring the resonant frequency of the entire meta-
surface to the specific frequency channel where the transmis-
sion is taking place. Secondly, some finer modification of res-
onances within this channel to cause different electromagnetic
variations in the wireless physical layer.
MeRFFI’s unit cell structure : MeRFFI prototype’s unit
cell has three layers: 1) a frequency selective resonant layer;
2) loading plane which helps in miniaturizing the dimensions
of the metamaterial and; 3) a reflective ground plane. There is
a variable capacitor C2 connected between the loading plane
and the ground plane. There is another capacitor C1 connected
between the slit after split-ring resonator in layer 1.
Specifications: The meta-surface unit element design is shown
in figure 4. We have used a split ring resonator as the top plane.
A complimentary split ring resonator is used as the loading
plane [8]. The dimensions of these layers are given in 5(a).
We have used varactor smv2023−079LF [41] as C1 and C2.
This lab prototype is shrunk to a half-wavelength dimension
of its original size, but for usage in much smaller devices, this
can be miniaturized further [42].
MeRFFI’s control mechanism : Figures 5(c) and
5(d)shows the voltage inputs given to all the varactors in
MeRFFI prototype. By changing the input voltage to the
capacitor C2, the capacitance between the loading plane and
reflecting plane changes. Since this control voltage (CV )
is connected to all the unit cells the total resonance of
the meta-surface shifts to the specific frequency channel.
Hence this voltage CV is the channel select voltage. The
change in resonant frequency with variation in capacitance
is shown in figure 6(The graph shown is a Comsol simulation
of MeRFFI, where the capacitance is changed by control
voltages, the value displayed here is frequency vs. radar cross
section[RCS](m2)) The other varactors C1 on the top layer,
6Figure 3. System model: MeRFFI based user enrollment and authentication system. Unauthorized user or attacker will be rejected by the system.
Figure 4. Geometry of a single miniaturized meta-material element used to
make the meta-surface
however, have independent voltage connections. If MeRFFI
has M number of elements, then an M line parallel but
independent control voltage line is needed for controlling the
varactors (SV1, SV2, .....SVM ). This M line control voltage
is what can be used to inject RF-fingerprints into the wireless
physical layer. The MeRFFI prototype has 4 unit elements as
shown in Figure 5 and two such prototypes were used for
security injection. Hence MeRFFI prototype had an 8 line
control input vector. The metasurface prototype has eight such
elements in which an 8-line control voltage feed can be given
for creating many such variations.
C. Mathematical Modeling
For modeling the injection of a physical layer signature, a
wideband communication channel is considered: Let x be the
signal transmitted by the ith IoT node.
yj(t) = x(t) ∗ s(t) ∗ hj(t) + ηj , (2)
Here yj is the jth frequency sample of the signal received
by the server and s is the function of the meta-surface and
h is the function of the multipath channel between node
i and the authentication server. Here s is the added sum
of the resonances of each of the elements in the reflector
array. The channel response received at the receiver is thus
a convolution of the MeRFFI’s transfer function (s) and the
channel multipath (h) similar to the sum of the product of
amplitude and phase responses caused by the individual’s path
in the multipath, the fingerprint is also the sum of the effect
caused by the individual unit elements in the reflect array. In
the frequency domain this injected channel response, is given
as:
SHj =
M−1∑
m=0
N−1∑
n=0
αmρne
j(θm+φn−2pif [τm+τn]), (3)
where SHj represents a sample of the signature injected
channel and it is a complex number that includes the amplitude
|S||Hj | and the phase ∠(φhj+θs) is shown as follows.
SHi = |S||Hj |∠(φhj+θs), (4)
Thus at the receiver we get the injected channel vector SH
for s CSI samples (here, the number of CSI samples j=s) , i.e
, SHi = [SH1, SH2, SH3, .SHj , ..., SHs]T , (5)
In general,
Y = SHX + n, (6)
From the received signal vector Y we extract SH . The
fingerprint induced CSI of the IoT node to the authentication
server has to be extracted.
SH = Y/X, (7)
After obtaining SH the injected fingerprint has to be separated
from this vector. Thus we can define a feature extraction space
χ, where the feature of a single fingerprint is translated to an
N-dimensional feature space.
χ : SH → F ≈ Sˆ, (8)
where F = {f1, f2, f3...fN}. After this we find a function
Ω, that can project the feature space of N users, F =
{f1, f2, f3...fN}, to class space, C = {c1, c2, c3....cN}, i.e.,
Ω : F → C, (9)
where the function Ω belongs to a hypothesis space Ω. After
the projection, the feature of the specific user is classified to
the corresponding class.
D. Signature Extraction and Classification
As mentioned in equation 5, we receive a vector of com-
plex values corresponding to the number of CSI samples in
the communication channel. A convolutional neural network
(CNN) was used to extract the signature from the computed
CSI vector SH . Although CNN is more computationally com-
plex, a server in IoT can afford the computational expenditure
during user enrollment, the matching (authentication) phase
would be just as simple as any other classfier algorithm. In
MeRFFI’s implementation, the first three layers of the CNN
are used to extract features. In each layer of the CNN, one-
dimensional kernels were used as the filters. This was followed
by a batch norm layer to normalize the mean and variance of
the data at each layer. For the third layer, a rectified linear
unit (ReLU) was added to introduce nonlinearity and a max-
pooling layer to reduce the size of the representation.If χ is
the set of parameters for feature extraction in the CNN, then
we get the feature F as:
F = CNN(SH;χ). (10)
Depending on the outputs of feature extractor (i.e., F), a fully
connected layer followed by another ReLU is used to learn
the representation Kof F as follows:
Ki = Wffi + bf , (11)
where Wf and bf are the parameters to be learned and
the softplus function is an activation function to introduce
7Figure 5. MeRFFI Prototype:(a) Dimension of the top layer (SRR) and the loading plane (CSRR) (b) Four unit prototype (c) Front View (d) control mechanism
Figure 6. Variation of Unit cell resonance with change in capacitance
nonlinearity, in order to identify the injected signature, the
feature representation Ki into a new latent space Hi ∈ IRm,
where m is the total number of signatures to be classified.
Finally, a Softmax layer is used to obtain the probability vector
of signatures:
Ci = Softmax(Hi), (12)
Hi = WkKi + bk, (13)
where Wk and bk are parameters. From this, we obtain classes
corresponding to the signatures Ci. A loss function L(c, cˆ) can
be defined where cˆ is the estimated class. The expected loss
of Ω (the entire classification function) can be estimated while
training, using an empirical risk function R, where
R =
1
N
∑
i
(ci,Ω(vi)). (14)
This measure helps us in avoiding overfitting and underfitting
scenarios while training. After the classifier is trained, the
classified features of the enrolled users are then stored in a
database. When a new incoming signal is received, its feature
is extracted and its score is computed with the features saved
in the database, which is then used for authentication.
E. Reconciling MeRFFI to Channel Dynamics
To design the MeRFFI metasurface to inject a robust RFF
into the wireless channel, we need to take in to account the
dynamics of the channel. Let’s consider a scenario where node
i is at a location x ∈ R2 and the receiving base station at
xb ∈ R2. The received signal strength γ(x) can be represented
as a 2D non-stationary field made up of three types of channel
dynamics [43]; path loss (γp(x)), shadow fading (γs(x)) and
the multipath fading component (γm(x)).
γ(x) = γp(x)γs(x)γm(x) (15)
Let the injected the injected signature be represented by the
random variable γsig( ~SV ,CV ), which is dependent only on
the channel select voltage CV and signature inject voltage
vector ~SV , the received signal strength becomes,
γ(x) = γp(x)γs(x)γm(x)γsig( ~SV ,CV ) (16)
In Decibels this equation is,
γdb(x) = 10 log(γp(x)) + 10log(γs(x)) + 10log(γm(x)
+10 log(γsig(CV, ~SV ))
(17)
From various indoor channel modeling based on real-world
measurements [43] , γp(x) is a distance dependent path loss,
and log(γs(x)) follows a zero mean gaussian distribution and
the channel multipath γm(x) follows a rician distribution as
given by,
fw(x) = (1 +Kr)e
−kr−(1+kr)xI0(2
√
xkr(kr + 1) (18)
Where Kr is the Rician K factor, which is the ratio between the
power in the direct-path (pd) and the diffused power, and I0(.)
is the 0th order Bessel function. By applying the expectation
operator on equation 17 and rearrange it to inequalities we
get,
γdb(x)− 10 log(γsig(CV, ~SV ) > 10 log(γp(x))
+10log(E(fw(x)))
(19)
Here the path loss has zero mean and we can deduce that the
gain of the RF-fingerprint injected should be greater that the
multipath power.
Consider a dynamic environment of an area of radius ||x−
xb|| with Nobj moving objects each at distances ri of the
receiver and having an average width of δw. These objects
absorb some part of the energy, by an absorb factor ζ and the
total path power is Pm. If the objects are uniformly distributed
with in the area has the following kr [44],
kr =
pd
pm
pi(rmax + rmin)
Nobj |ζ|2δw (20)
From this equation, we can infer that the rician factor and
hence mean dynamic value of the multipath power is influ-
enced by the number of moving objects per unit area [44]
(Kr = 0 means a highly dynamic channel).
8F. Channel Robust Metasurface Design
For the injected signature to be prominent in this dynamic
environment, MeRFFI metasurface’s SNR with in a short delay
spread has to be above the threshold level of the maximum
variations caused by channel dynamics. Practically this is the
metasurface’s expected capability where it provides construc-
tive interference on the channel, which aids the communication
by enhancing certain narrow frequency components. This is
contrary to the frequency selective fading introduced by the
multipath and requires the metasurface to be tuned to the
operating frequency. The maximum gain of the metasurface
is obtained when the perimeter of the unit cell is of the
order of the wavelength used for communication (λ). The
gain reduces when the unit cell’s size is shrunk. The idea
is to choose the metasurface’s size to make the constructively
added perturbations to withstand channel variations and at the
same time conform to the devices form factor. Our prototype
is thus built with the perimeter of each unit cell of the order of
λ/4 (65 mm), which is sufficient for a time varying, dynamic,
real-world indoor environment.
Remark: Designing the metasurface channel robust also
has the advantage that the injected Rf-fingerprint dataset size
becomes independent of the channel, robust to time variance
and depends only on the injected code.
V. EXPERIMENT AND RESULTS
As indicated in the previous sections MeRFFI is a low
cost and small attachment to the IoT transmitter’s hardware,
that can inject a radio frequency fingerprint (RFF) into the
wireless physical layer. Technically MeRFFI’s hardware can
be used either in passive mode, where it injects a fixed physical
signature or in active mode, where it can inject varying
physical signature according to an input control voltage vector
and also has the capability to select the channel (frequency) of
operation. To test MeRFFI’s performance both in active and
passive mode, the prototype as shown in figure 5(b) was built
in the lab. Extensive experiments have been performed using
this MeRFFI prototype for testing its potency as a wireless
physical layer injection system for the IoT applications. All
the experiments were performed in a dynamic environment
wherein, between 2 and 6 people are always present the
testbed’s vicinity. The testing duration also spanned between
4 and 12 hours per day over 60 days to give the collected
dataset a time varying factor.
In this section, we present MeRFFI’s control mechanism
set up, performance measures used followed by the exper-
iments in which the MeRFFI system was tested. Initially,
we test MeRFFI’s control mechanism via an experimental
setup using a Vector Network Analyzer, where we inject
different control codes and visually observe the changes in
the wireless channel. After making sure the proof-of-concept
software programmability of MeRFFI works, we conduct the
following experiments on a WiFi commercial off the shelf
(COTS) testbed to test MeRFFI, if it satisfies the specified
design goals:
(a) Inject 208 closely-spaced control codes and observe the
performance to estimate the user capacity of our prototype. (b)
Test the performance with change in distance. Here, changes
Figure 7. Different patterns of forward gain S21 observed on the Vector
Network Analyzer to different C1 input voltage vectors
in distance upto 53 m in an indoor multipath channel were
made and the resulting performance was analyzed. (c) Test the
impact of orientations of the user devices. (d) Test the effect
of blockage by the through-the-wall experiments. (e) Test the
performance of the system, when same set of signatures are
injected in different WiFi channels.
A. MeRFFI Metasurface and Control Mechanism
Two 4-unit cell based structures were used in all the
experiments(figure 5). As mentioned in section 5, two types
of control (figure 5(c) & (d)) are required. a) control voltage
CV , which is a single parallel voltage to supplied to all
the individual elements to select the channel of operation, b)
control voltage vector ~SV = {SV1, SV2, .....SVM}, is used to
inject different RF-signatures in the selected channel. We use
an Arduino Mega 2560 to drive the DAC circuit to provide
CV , and two similar sources were used to feed in the control
vector ~SV = {SV1, SV2, ...SVi, ...SVM}.
Different SVi inputs correspond to an individual unit cell
control input, and this was made sure with the above men-
tioned voltage sources and voltage divider circuits.
B. Performance Measures
For computing the performance of the classification system
designed, we first compute the following: a) true positive
(TP): the digital signatures correctly identified, b) true
negative (TN): the fingerprints correctly rejected, c) false
positive (FP): the false signature wrongly identified, and d)
false negative (FN): a valid signature misclassified as false.
These values are used to compute the standard performance
measures sensitivity ( recall, hit rate, or true positive rate
(TPR)), Fall-out or false positive rate (FPR), Precision or
positive predictive value (PPV), Accuracy (ACC), F1 Score,
area under the ROC(receiver operating characteristic) curve.
Since this is a multi-class classification problem. We compute
the micro and macro average of all the performance measures
shown above. Hence we perform an M number of one
vs. all classifications for all the classes and compute this
micro and macro averages performance measure, which
would give us an overall performance of the signatures
classified at the receiver. A sample of how micro and macro
averages are computed. An example for computing the micro
and macro average of precision (PPVµ and PPVM )is given as
PPVµ =
TP1 + TP2
TP1 + TP2 + FP1 + FP2
. (21)
PPVM =
P1 + P2
2
. (22)
9Figure 8. Room setting, where the experiments were performed.
We use the micro and macro averages to create the average
ROC and then compute the AUCµ / AUCM average, which
would give us a good sense of the overall performance of the
system.
C. Testing MeRFFI’s Control Mechanism
Objective: To visually observe changes caused in the wire-
less channel caused by the control voltage input given to
MeRFFI and thereby verifying if MeRFFI’s channel select and
signature inject control mechanisms are working.
Experimental setup: To test whether the designed meta-
surface performs as per the design specification, an Agilent
Vector Network Analyzer (model-8753ES) was used. MeRFFI
was kept near the TX antenna, and S21 (forward gain)
was observed from the receiver end, which is kept 2.54 m
away. At first control input CV was changed, and changes
were observed at the VNA. The experiment was done in a
conference room with the setting as seen in figure 9.
Results and inferences: At 16.1 volts a peak was observed
within the range 2.420 GHz and 2.425 GHz, which indicates
that CV was functioning as the channel selector. Then random
voltage vectors ~SV was applied and distinct S21(forward gain)
patterns corresponding to different ~SV inputs were observed
as seen in the figure 7. This pre-test helped us validate the
channel select mechanism and different patterns observed at
the VNA verify that the signature injection mechanism of
MeRFFI is functional.
D. Determining Signature Capacity of MeRFFI
Objective: In this experiment, 208 codes, which are very
close to each other (very minimum voltage change in each
input control), are given as input SV. This experiment is to
Table I
MODEL SUMMARY OF THE CNN USED FOR 208 CODE.
Layer (Type) Output Shape Param#
conv1d 1 (Conv1D) (30, 24) 120
activation 1 (Activation) (30, 24) 0
flatten 1 (Flatten) (720) 0
dense 1 (Dense) (2048) 1476608
dropout 1 (Dropout) (2048) 0
dense 2 (Dense) (1024) 2098176
dense 3 (Dense) (208) 213200
activation 2 (Activation) (208) 0
Total params: 3,788,104
Trainable params: 3,788,104
Figure 9. Experimental setup with the COTS MeRFFI.
classify these 208 closely-spaced signatures received at the
receiver and estimate the signature capacity of MeRFFI.
Experimental setup: This experiment was performed in a
conference room 10.16× 6.35 m, whose plan is displayed in
figure 8 and the position is marked with label A. This room
was chosen so that the environment is not controlled, which
includes other commercial wireless interferences. The COTS
experimental devices used were a Lenovo ThinkPad E570
equipped with an Intel 8265ac NIC card as the transmitter,
and a Dell Latitude E6530 fitted with an Intel 5300ac NIC
card as the receiver. MeRFFI was placed 2 cm in front of the
transmitter’s inbuilt antenna as shown in figure 9. The receiver
is placed 2.54 m away from the transmitter. The experimental
setup as in figure 9. The values of the control voltages SV1 for
each unit cell are varied from 0 till 10, while the control inputs
to other unit cells are kept zero. Twenty six voltage values
were given to each capacitor, and the changes were done on
all the eight different unit cells. Thus making it 208 different
code words triggering that many injected codes, which have
very minimum variation from one to the next. The number of
voltage values that can be given to each unit element depends
on the dynamic range of the varactor chosen. The data set
collected 500 CSI vector values received for each signature.
The structure of the CNN used for classifying this data is
shown in table I.
Result and inference: Table II shows the accuracy and the
F1 score (micro and macro averages) for 80:20 and 90:10 test
to train percentage split. The values suggest that MeRFFI RF-
Fingerprinting has a substantial signature capacity and is very
reliable. In the above experiment, each unit cell was triggered
by 26 voltage levels one after the other. Based on the technical
specification of the varactor [41] used in creating this variation
a maximum of 32 different physical signatures.
To generalize, consider a MeRFFI prototype that has M
unit elements in the metasurface. Each of these unit elements
can create several capacitance variations depending on the
dynamic characteristics of the varactor connected to them. If
Rd is the dynamic range of the varactor, Vt is the minimum
control voltage needed to create capacitance change of the
varactor, and M is the total number of unit elements in the
metasurface, the number of signatures that can be injected by
MeRFFI can be written as :
N = (Rd/Vt)
M , (23)
From this equation, we can interpret that a high resolution
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varactor with a higher dynamic range can achieve a large
design space for signatures.
In a perfect environment with low noise, the MeRFFI
prototype in the lab that has 8 unit cells can create a maximum
488 (245) signatures. Thus a more significant number of unit
cells in MeRFFI would result in a higher signature capacity.
E. Performance with Variation in Distance (Path Loss)
Objective: This experiment is performed to test the varia-
tion in the performance of the MeRFFI system with varying
distances (Path loss increases with increasing distance).
Experimental setup: This experiment is performed using
the same COTS devices mentioned in the previous experiment.
Here the distance of the receiver is varied in each experiment
(distance). The receiver is kept at three different distances 7 m,
27 m and 53 m from the receiver location and the experiment is
done on WiFi’s channel 5. The experimental setup is labeled
as ’B’ in the figure 8 and as seen in the figure, is a 53 m
long corridor, thus a complex environment from the wireless
channel perspective. Twelve different signatures were injected
through the MeRFFI device on the transmitted wireless signal.
Packets are transmitted for 20 seconds for each signature. The
signatures received at the receiver are classified using a CNN
whose structure is similar to the one shown in the table I.
Here only 20 percent of the data is used for training and the
remaining 80 percent is used for testing.
Result and inference: Table III shows the performance of
the MeRFFI system with different distances 7m, 27m, and
53m. It can be seen that the system performs well, despite
the wireless channel being a complex tunnel-like environment.
Hence MeRFFI’s injected signature does not significantly
vanish from the wireless physical layer with distance. Since
MeRFFI’s application scenario requires it to be kept very close
to the transmitter, it can be inferred that the injected signatures
exist at very short delay spread compared to other multipath
components that come into picture when the communication
distance increases.
F. Impact of Orientation
Objective: This experiment is done to test whether a change
in orientation between the transmitter and receiver affects the
performance of MeRFFI’s RF-fingerprint injection capability.
Experimental setup: This experiment was performed
in the same COTS equipment mentioned in the previous
experiment. The transmitting laptop has the Intel 8265ac is
attached with the MeRFFI device and is kept at a fixed
location. The receiver laptop is at a distance of 2.54 m from
Table II
TESTING SIGNATURE CAPACITY, CLASSIFY OF 208 INJECTED SIGNATURES.
Test− Train
Split Acc F1µ F1M AUCM AUCµ
80% test 0.81 0.9848 0.9932 0.9 0.9
90% test 0.7415 0.9774 0.9781 0.87 0.87
Table III
PERFORMANCE WITH VARYING DISTANCE.
Distance Acc F1µ F1M AUCµ AUCM
7 m 0.8914 0.9819 0.9407 0.9407 0.9412
27 m 0.8297 0.9716 0.9071 0.9071 0.9062
53 m 0.9128 0.9854 0.9524 0.9524 0.9527
the transmitter. The experimental setup is marked ’D’ in the
figure 8. The position of the receiver is then varied by 30
degrees with the distance being the same. The same 12 voltage
values are injected in four such orientations 0◦, 30◦, 60◦, and
90◦ respectively. This data is then classified using CNN for
each location, and their performance is compared. Same as
the previous experiment, 20 percent of the data is used for
training, and the remaining 80 percent is used for testing.
Result and inference: Table IV shows the performance of
the MeRFFI system with varying orientation. The minimum
accuracy obtained was 95.42 percentage. It can be seen that
the change of orientation does not affect the performance of
this system.
G. Through Wall Signature Injection
Objective: This experiment is done to test the MeRFFI’s
signature injection capability when there is a blockage between
the transmitter and the receiver.
Experimental setup: This experimental setup, which is
represented as ’C’ in the figure 8 is placed such that the
transmitter is in one room 100 m away from the wall and
the receiver is placed 0.3 m away from the wall in the next
room. There is no other line of sight available for these COTS
devices to communicate. The same 12 codes as in the previous
experiment are injected by the transmitter. The received codes
are classified using the CNN classifier with the structure as
given in table I. In this case, also, 20 percent of the data was
used for training, and the remaining 80 percent was used for
testing.
Result and inference: As it can be seen from the table
V MeRFFI performs well through a wall. With 20 percent
training and remaining test, MeRFFI has the potential to be
applied for real-world scenarios with obstruction.
H. Effect of Using Multiple Channels
Objective: To test the hypothesis that the same signature
injected by MeRFFI appears as a different one if the devices
use a different channel for communication.
Experimental setup: Here we use the test set up ’A’ as
shown in figure 8. Twenty four signatures were injected in 4
different channels. Thus a 96 class recognition system had to
be built.
Result and inference The minimum micro averaged AUC
for test to train ratio varying from 50% to 80% was observed to
be 0.95. Table VI shows the averaged F1 scores and accuracy.
From the observations, we can validate this hypothesis that
MeRFFI’s signature appears different when observed from a
different channel number.
Table IV
PERFORMANCE OF ORIENTATION VARIATION.
Angle
(deg) Acc F1µ F1M AUCµ AUCM
0 0.989 0.9981 0.994 0.994 0.9939
30 0.9542 0.9923 0.975 0.975 0.975
60 0.9792 0.9965 0.9887 0.9887 0.9887
90 0.9819 0.9969 0.9901 0.9901 0.9902
Table V
PERFORMANCE OF MERFFI THOUGH THE WALL.
Acc F1µ F1M AUCµ AUCM
Blockage 0.9678 0.9946 0.9824 0.9824 0.9825
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Figure 10. Communication between IoT node ’i’ and server ’s’, where ’at’
is trying to attack the system.
I. Throughput, Power, Cost and other Inferences
All the above experiments were done in using IEEE 802.11
ac very high throughput mode (VHT). The data rate is always
above 50 Mbps, thus indicating that the injected perturbations
dont significance hinder the datarate.
The cost of manufacturing our prototype was less than 10
dollars including the Commercial varactor chips. The cost
was kept low due to in lab design and fabrication. On mass
production these materials would cost less than 20 cents per
device.
The entire power including the control mechanism, i.e.,
channel select and signature inject code was less than 50
millijoules (0.05 Ws), which when compared to DSP chip
is 67% less power consumed. The energy consumption of a
programmable MeRFFI module does not vary with packet size.
In our COTS testbed, the above results indicate that MeRFFI
is very suitable for commercial IoT adoption.
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we discuss whether our proposed system is
vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle scenario and replay attack.
A. Threat Model
Consider an RF-Fingerprint authentication scenario, as seen
in figure 10, where an IoT node ’i’, which has the MeRFFI
module attached, is trying to access an authentication server
’s’. There is a man-in-the-middle scenario where an attacker
’at’ is trying to break this authentication mechanism. Here,
’at’ can try to impersonate the genuine node ’i’. Let yi(t)
be the original signal from the node i that is received at the
server s. This can be represented as
, yi(t) = x(t) ∗ s(t) ∗ hi→s(t) + η→s (24)
where s(t) is the transfer function of MeRFFI module and
hi→s(t) be the impulse response of the IoT node to the server
channel. In comparison to this, yat(t) the received signal
replayed by the attacker and received by the server can is
given by:
yat(t) = x(t) ∗ s(t) ∗ hi→at(t) ∗ fat(t) ∗ hat→s(t) + ηat (25)
Table VI
CLASSIFYING 24 SIGNATURES IN 4 CHANNELS (96 CLASSES).
Test− Train
Split Acc F1µ F1M AUCM AUCµ
50% test 0.9429 0.9799 0.9865 0.97 0.96
60% test 0.9104 0.9866 0.9862 0.95 0.95
70% test 0.93 0.9875 0.9872 0.97 0.97
80% test 0.903 0.9746 0.9865 0.91 0.91
90% test 0.8454 0.9704 0.9862 0.92 0.92
Here hi→at(t) is the impulse response of node i to attacker at
channel and hat→s(t) is the channel response from attacker
to server. let fat be the filter function of the attacker. From
equations 24 and 25 we can see that in-order for the attacker
to successfully replay the injected feature, the following con-
dition should be satisfied:
s(t) ∗ hi→s(t) = s(t) ∗ hi→at(t) ∗ fat(t) ∗ hat→s(t), (26)
Assumptions: The attacker can launch the replay attack in
mainly two ways [17], signal replay attack and feature replay
attack. In a signal replay attack, ’at’ records node i’s signal
and simply re-transmits the signal without any modification.
Here the attacker does not need to know the features that are
injected. In a feature replay attack, the attacker does not know
the injected features but is trying to derive such information,
in which the filter function of the attacker Fat is tuned such
that the signal from the attacker yat(t) is same as that the
original signal from node i, i.e., yi(t).
B. Robustness Against Attacks
1) Against Signal Replay Attack :: From equation (25)
we can see that the attacker has no way of reproducing the
physical channel by merely doing a signal replay attack, since
fat(t), in this case, would be equal to a constant gain value g.
The only case when a signal replay attack may work is when
the attacker is very close (less than λ/4 distance from the tx
or rx, also known as the guard zone [45]). For 2.4 GHz WiFi,
this would be 6.25 cm.
2) Against Feature Replay Attack :: Let the injected chan-
nel response s(t) ∗h(t) be denoted as sh. Then the frequency
domain representation of the filter function of the attacker can
be derived from the previous equation as:
Fat(a exp
jω) =
SHi→s(a1ejω)
SHi→at(a2ejω) ∗ SHat→s(a3ejω) , (27)
This equation shows the difficulty of the attacker as it has to
simultaneously and accurately model three different channel
models and then use it to precisely find a filter response that
when transmitted through the air would physically be equal to
the injected signature by MeRFFI in node i’s signal. Looking
this difficulty from a computational aspect: if we are using
a 64 subcarrier WiFi signal, the attacker has to accurately
model three channel responses. For each of the three channel
responses, the attacker has to find a vector of 64 complex
numbers, then use this vector to accurately model the injected
signal response, which is another complex vector of size 64.
C. Experimental Validation:
A feature replay attack scenario was set up in the lab to test
MeRFFI. A Lenovo ThinkPad E570 equipped with an Intel
8265ac NIC card with MeRFFI attached as the transmitting
node and a Dell Latitude E6530 fitted with an Intel 5300ac
NIC card as the receiver. Another Dell latitude E6530 placed
2.54 m diagonally away from the tx node, as shown in figure
11. Here the attacker has the same MeRFFI device and is
assumed to know the channel control voltage CV , the specific
channel number (frequency) of operation and several signature
control vectors ~SV (secret hardware key) and their channel
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Figure 11. (a) Receiver broadcasting packets using MeRFFI - attacker and
receiver training (b) Attacker transmitting guessed signatures with MeRFFI
responses. The security system here is a function approximator
at the receiver, which approximates the ~SV at the receiver.
The estimated value at the receiver ( ~SVr) is granted access if
the distance with the actual value is less than the threshold
distance (dth), dist( ~SV , ~SVr) < dth. The attacker snoops the
signals that are transmitted by the legit node and trains a
function approximator with the known ~SV . The attacker then
uses the trained model to guess the signature SVat used by
the legit node. It then attempts an attack on the receiver by
transmitting a signal with a signature generated by an identical
MeRFFI driven by the estimated SVat.
Result: The training was done on the attacker and the receiver
using a broadcasted 5500 packets by the Tx whose ~SV is
known (we assume the security standard is public where
everyone in the network knows the injection codes). The
function approximator used has the same structure as the
table I and dth of value 4 was chosen. 500 packets were
transmitted by the attacking node to the receiver. We observed
that the receiver denied access to all the 500 packets that were
transmitted by the attacker, where as the receiver’s packets
were all accepted.
The above attack filter model was described in terms of
protocol 1 when MeRFFI is injecting only one static signature.
Note that for our system in protocols 2 and 3 where MeRFFI
is programmable and its signatures can change with each
packet transmitted, it is nearly impossible to be cracked. Other
than the above mentioned scenario, the attacker may also
have the capability to record the downlink channel without
the signature, inverse it and then compare with the injected
channel to isolate the signature. But reciprocity of the channel
is usually an assumption to get approximated CSI, due to the
detrimental changes in the transceiver components and the
channel [46], thus making this measurement inadequate for
the attacker.
VII. DISCUSSIONS
A. Security-Reliability Trade-off
The radio frequency fingerprint community has been trying
to address the contradicting tradeoff between security and reli-
ability [20]. With MeRFFI we have optimized the dimensions
based on our theoretical deductions in section IV-E to maintain
an optimum between security and reliability based on the
environment.
B. Size Matters
The metamaterial research community has been actively
researching the [42] area of Frequency Selective Surfaces
(FSS). The Prototype created in our lab has been miniaturized
to half the size of its original dimension. Size reduction up to
1/16 of the original dimension is common in the metamaterial
research community. This miniaturization is also accompanied
by narrowed operating bandwidth of the frequency selective
surface and reduced gain. The narrow bandwidth is good for
RFF injection, a smaller number of perturbations can be made
in the operating frequency, but a reduced gain can make the
authentication system sensitive to environmental effects. Thus,
while designing the size of MeRFFI, we have to take into
consideration the application and the frequency of operation.
C. Enabling Node Movement
In MeRFFI’s classifier design, we used a CNN that is robust
in a static environment, but if the receiver has to be moved
from one place to another, it would have to be retrained in
the system. This is because the feature representation may
not able to linearly separate the injected signature from the
environmental multipath. This can be solved either using
transfer learning approaches [47] or using 2 step tranmission
for authentication. To further clarify, if the feature represen-
tation of the injected signatures made in one room is termed
source domain data and the representation in another room is
the target domain data, we would want the features learned
from the source domain to be valid in the target domain. In
statistical terms, we need to reduce the difference between the
distributions of the source and target domain data.
Another way of solving this problem is to use a two code
transmission for authentication. where the difference in the
injected CSI’s at the receiver can yield the actual code. Our
future work includes realizing this authentication scheme.
D. Energy Harvesting FSS
Our experimental results suggest that an active Frequency
Selective Surface (FSS) offers much more secure physical
layer signatures than a passive one. Although the active
MeRFFI prototype made in the lab consumes very minimal
power, low power IoT applications would need energy har-
vesting based FSS [48] that does not need an external battery.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we design and implement the MeRFFI, a small
and inexpensive metasurface, which injects RF-fingerprints
into the wireless physical layer. Through experiments on a
COTS testbed, we have shown that these signatures are very
reliable and have a large design space. MeRFFI consumes only
very little power to produce distinguishable RFFs, thus making
it very suitable for IoT applications. We have suggested
three easily integrable protocols using MeRFFI, where we
have suggested the scenarios where MeRFFI can be used in
a passive form or active form depending on the priorities
and needs of a specific IoT network. Our security analysis
discusses how significantly more complex this system is to be
cracked compared to the current state-of-the-art.
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